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Municipal Law
ByJ. DAVID Moms*
INTRODUCTION
The 1980 General Assembly enacted a sweeping reform of
municipal law in Kentucky. The body of existing municipal law
which had dated to 1894 was repealed in great part and replaced
by a concise municipal code (hereinafter referred to as the Code)
consisting of less than fifty statutes.' This economy of legislation,
so rare in this prolix age, was made possible by one statutory sec-
tion of only fifty-two words which fundamentally changed the
way the General Assembly delegates power to cities.2 That sta-
tute granted to cities what has come to be known as "home rule."
Home rule made possible three fundamental changes in munic-
ipal law. First, it obviated the need for the great number of sta-
tutes delegating specific powers which had previously been the
only way the General Assembly could delegate powers to cities.
Second, it permitted statutes to be drafted broadly so that cities
would have greater discretion. Third, because necessary statu-
tory guidelines can be drafted broadly, more statutory provisions
can be uniform for all cities. Together these changes give cities in
Kentucky far greater flexibility and authority to handle their
local affairs than they ever had in the past. This Survey will
examine those changes and what the new law means to Ken-
tucky's more than 400 cities.
I. MUMCIPAL POWERS
A. Dillon's Rule
Cities derive all their powers from the state, either through
the state constitution, statutes, or charters authorized by the
state.3 While a minority view asserts that local governments have
*Committee Staff Administrator, Standing Committee on Cities, Kentucky General As-
sembly. J.D. 1976, University of Louisville.
11980 Ky. Acts, chapters 115, 116, 232, 233, 234, 235 & 239.
2 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 82.082(1) (Bobbs-Merril 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 A city is a type of municipal corporation which may be described as
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a basis independent of the state, "the great weight of authority
denies in toto the existence... of any inherent right of local
self-government which is beyond legislative control."4 The nine-
teenth century commentator on municipal law, Judge Dillon,
forcefully explained the status cities enjoy under the common
law:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and
control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation... the
legislature might, by a single act, if we can suppose it capable
of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence
all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corpora-
tion could not prevent it.5
Judge Dillon developed this observation into what became
known as "Dillon's Rule," the fundamental principle of munic-
ipal law:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a mu-
nicipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following
powers, and no others. First, those granted in express words;
second, those necessarily orfairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpora-
tion,-not simply convenient, but indispensable. 6
The vast majority of American jurisdictions adhere to
Dillon's Rule. As recently as 1980, the Kentucky Supreme Court
affirmed its adherence to this rule in City of Bowling Green v.
T & E Electrical Contractors,7 by stating that the "general rule
a body politic and corporate, established by a sovereign power, evidenced
by a charter, with a defined area, a population, a corporate name, and per-
petual succession, established primarily to regulate the local or internal af-
fain of the area incorporated, and secondarily to share in the civil govern-
ment of the state in the particular locality.
C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS § 1.3, at 2 (1980).
4 1 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 98, at 154 (5th ed. 1911), quoted in
Note, Municipal Home Rule for Kentucky?, 54 Ky. L.J. 757 (1965-66).
5 City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
6 1 J. DILLON, supra note 4, § 237, at 448-49.
7 602 S.W.2d434 (Ky. 1980).
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[is] that a city possesses only those powers expressly granted by
the Constitution and statutes plus such powers as are necessarily
implied or incident to the expressly granted powers and which
are indispensable to enable it to carry out its declared objects,
purposes and expressed powers."8
Because of Dillon's Rule, cities have tended to be overly cau-
tious, seldom undertaking an action unless explicitly permitted
by statute, and have thus encouraged state legislatures to enact
municipal legislation to ensure an express grant of power for
every occasion. Therefore cities have been slow to adopt innova-
tive ideas and solutions either because they felt they lacked the
authority, or because, by the time they convinced the legislature
to grant the authority, the idea was no longer innovative.9
B. The Effect of Dillon's Rule in Kentucky
In Kentucky, Dillon's Rule contributed to the growth of a
vast accretion of municipal statutes spread from one end of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes to the other. 10 This unbridled growth
process began when Kentucky adopted a new constitution in
1891 that required a change in the way powers were granted to
cities." Prior to that new constitution, the General Assembly had
enacted special charters for individual cities. The new constitu-
tion forbade special legislation but permitted the division of cities
into classes based upon population, permitting laws for cities to
differ between classes but requiring uniformity within a partic-
ular class.' 2 This classified charter system was necessary because
it was practically impossible to apply the same laws to all cities,
and-as a result of the specificity demanded by Dillon's Rule-it
8 Id. at 435.
9 See Dean, The Dillon Rule-A Limit on Local Government Powers, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 546 (1976).
10 in 1976, the Municipal Statute Revision Commission undertook the task of com-
piling every provision of the KRS relating to cities. The resulting document was presented
on newspaper size pages in a four column format and was 377 pages long. THE MUNICIPAL
STATUTE RvisioN COMMISSION, A CoMPAnT vE ARRANCEMENT OF MuNICIPAL STATUTES
OF KENTUCKY (1976).
11 For a discussion of the treatment afforded cities under Kentucky's three previous
constitutions, see LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION. INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN No.
138, THE NEW MUNICIPAL LAw 25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE NEW MUNICIPAL LAWI.
12 KY. CONST. §§ 59, 60 & 156.
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would have been impossible to construct a body of municipal law
equally beneficial and useful to the largest and the smallest
cities.13
In 1893 the General Assembly enacted, in effect, six different
municipal codes in conformity with the scheme laid out in the
Kentucky Constitution. 4 This system, and in fact most of the
laws first enacted in 1893, remained in effect until 1980 when the
Code was enacted. The 1893 legislation served as a core around
which new legislation was layered year after year. A cycle de-
veloped which found city officials and other interest groups mak-
ing biennial trips to Frankfort to plead for new legislation to sat-
isfy their current individual needs. Unfortunately, rarely did the
legislature take the time to examine the body of law that it had
allowed to develop so haphazardly, to repeal obsolete laws or to
correct inconsistencies or contradictions. As a 1979 legislative re-
port stated, "the body of municipal law.., had grown like
13 The cities and towns of this Commonwealth, for the purposes of their
organization and government, shall be divided into six classes. The organ-
ization and powers of each class shall be defined and provided for by gen-
eral laws, so that all municipal corporations of the same class shall possess
the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions. To the first class
shall belong cities with a populaton of one hundred thousand or more; to
the second class, cities with a population of twenty thousand or more, and
less than one hundred thousand; to the third class, cities with a population
of eight thousand or more, and less than twenty thousand; to the fourth
class, cities and towns with a population of three thousand or more, and
less than eight thousand; to the fifth class, cities and towns with a popula-
tion of one thousand or more, and less than three thousand; to the sixth
class, towns with a population of less than one thousand. The General As-
sembly shall assign the cities and towns of the Commonwealth to the
classes to which they respectively belong, and change assignments made as
the population of said cities and towns may increase or decrease and in the
absence of other satisfactory information as to their population, shall be
governed by the last preceding Federal census in so doing; but no city or
town shall be transferred from one class to another, except in pursuance of
a law previously enacted and providing therefor. The General Assembly,
by a general law, shall provide how towns may be organized, and enact
laws for the government of such towns until the same are assigned to one
or the other of the classes above named; but such assignment shall be made
at the first session of the General Assembly after the organization of said
town or city.
Ky. CoNsT. § 156.
14 See note 18 infra for a list of former KBS chapters devoted to city charters.
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'Topsy' during the past 80 years."' Over 2000 statutes applied to
cities, 6 some applicable to all classes, some to just one class, and
some to several classes. It became increasingly difficult for city
officials to negotiate this thicket of legislation to determine exact-
ly what powers their cities did possess. 17
Each class of city still retained a separate "charter" of laws,
although the reasons for much of the disparate treatment had
long since ceased to exist.' 8 A typical charter for a city class con-
sisted of a core of statutes, dating from the original 1893 legisla-
tion, which set out the organizational structure of the city, the
officers required and their qualifications, and the basic powers
and responsibilities of the city. Over the yearsan ever increasing
number of statutes granting specific powers were tacked on to
this core. These statutes were usually permissive, but if the city
decided to exercise the power delegated, specific requirements
and procedures were usually mandated. 9 These statutes greatly
1 5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT STATUTE REVISION COMMISSION, TOWARD A NEW FOUNDA-
TION: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE 1980 GENERAL ASSEMBLY 9 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as TOWARD A NEW FouNDATION]. This commission was the last in a line of legisla-
tively authorized study groups which had considered the possible revision of Kentucky's
municipal statutes. Beginning in 1974, the Interim Joint Committee on Cities, a standing
committee of the General Assembly, began a series of hearings to determine the state of
Kentucky's cities. Those investigations led to the creation of the Municipal Statute Revi-
sion Commission. That commission, after two years of work, drafted a proposed munic-
ipal code which was introduced before the 1978 General Assembly. The bill, 1978 House
Bill 87, failed to pass, but a new commission, the Local Government Statute Revision
Commission, was established to keep alive the idea of municipal statute revision. The
commission proposed a series of bills based upon the unsuccessful 1978 House Bill 87,
which were enacted by the 1980 General Assembly and constitute the subject of this arti-
cle. TOWARD A NEW FOUNDATION, supra, at 9-11.
1 Id.
17 The situationwas exacerbated by the fact that municipal government in Kentucky
is a part-time endeavor. Only the two largest cities have full-time mayors and no cities
have legislative bodies made up entirely of persons who devote full time to their elected
positions. This basic fact of municipal life was one of the primary reasons for simplifying
the law.
18 Each class of city had a separate chapter of the KRS devoted to its charter. KRS
chapter 83 (repealed in part, renumbered in part 1980) related to cities of the first class,
KRS chapter 84 (repealed in part 1980) to cities of the second class, KRS chapter 85 (re-
pealed in part 1980) to cities of the third class, KRS chapter 86 (repealed in part, renum-
bered in part 1980) to cities of the fourth class, KRS chapter 87 (repealed 1980) to cities of
the fifth class, and KRS chapter 88 (repealed 1980) to cities of the sixth class. In addition,
KRS chapter 89 (repealed in part 1980) related to city manager and commission plan
cities.
19 See, e.g., KRS chapters 97 (repealed in part 1980), 104 (repealed in part 1980y,
105 (repealed 1980), & 106.
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complicated municipal law, because they had been enacted in a
piecemeal rather than an orderly fashion to meet the ad hoc
needs of individual cities. Because of the detail contained in these
statutes, cities were often unwilling to use one which, while ap-
plicable to their class, had actually been enacted specifically for a
particular city in the class. Therefore, as was often the case, City
of X would request the legislature to enact a statute granting a
power already granted to the class, but tailored to the desires of
City of Y. A statute would then be enacted granting the same
power to City of X, but specifying a different procedure. This
process in one case resulted in seven different statutes detailing
who would control a city parks system.20
Legislative study groups began to examine the need for mu-
nicipal statute revision in the early 1970's and undertook the task
of tidying up the litter of statutes that had developed. However,
it was no simple task to "tidy up" the statutes because no one
knew which cities were operating under what statutes. Every
statute, no matter how obscure, seemed to have one city cham-
pioning it and alleging that it was absolutely necessary for that
city's purposes. Of course this also pointed out the incredible lack
of uniformity which existed among cities in Kentucky. Every city
seemed to be using its own unique set of statutes. The simplest
solution was to discard the old system entirely and then to grant
powers in a broad general fashion. Cities would lose their specific
grants of power, but would retain those powers by a single grant
of broad "home rule" powers. Cities would be free to fashion
their own programs, but would also-be free to continue to oper-
ate as they had previously under a specific grant, if they so de-
sired.
C. Home Rule
Home rule for cities is not a new concept. The first grant of
municipal home rule was to St. Louis in 1875.21 In Kentucky,
20 See KRS chapter 97 (repealed in part 1980). In addition, many statutes granted
authority to do things which were outdated or downright archaic. See, e.g., KRS § 86.170
(1971) (repealed 1980) which in a rather Hogarthian turn of phrase permitted cities of the
fourth class to protect the public morals by restraining and punishing "rakes and whore-
mongers."
21 Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. IX § 20.
[Vol. 70
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Louisville, the only city of the first class, was granted home rule
by the General Assembly in 1972.22 In 1972 and 1978 counties
were granted home rule.2
1. The Theory of Home Rule
Home rule is a simple concept which reverses the equation by
which the legislature grants power to cities. Home rule does not
abrogate Dillon's Rule; cities still possess only those powers spe-
cifically delegated. What home rule does is reverse how the Gen-
eral Assembly delegates powers. Instead of only delegating those
powers it feels are necessary for cities, as in the past, the General
Assembly under home rule delegates all possible municipal
2 The legislative body of a city of the first class shall have the power to
exercise all of the rights, privileges, powers, franchises, including the
power to levy all taxes, not in conflict with the constitution and so as to
provide for the health, education, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of
the city, to the same extent and with the same force and effect as if the gen-
eral assembly had granted and delegated to the legislative body of the city
all of the authority and powers that are within its powers to grant to a mu-
nicipal corporation as if expressly enumerated herein. Nothing therein
contained to the contrary, the provisions of KRS chapters 65, 66, 76, 77,
79, 80, 89, 91, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 and 109
shall be considered permissive rather than mandatory and the powers,
rights and duties therein delineated may be modified or delegated by the
legislative body to different departments and agencies of city government
and any restrictions therein set forth shall not be considered abridging in
any manner the complete grant of home rule set forth in this grant of
power except no right heretofore vested by operation of statute shall in any
way be affected.
Act of Mar. 28, 1972, ch. 243, § 12, 1972 Ky. Acts 1018, 1023 (codified at KRS § 83.520
(1980)).
2 The 1972 enactment, Act. of Mar. 27, 1972, ch. 384, 1972 Ky. Acts 1652, was de-
clared unconstitutional in Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. City of Louisville, 559
S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1977). The 1972 Act read as follows:
(1) The fiscal court of any county is hereby authorized and empowered to
exercise all the rights, powers, franchises, and privileges including the
power to levy all taxes not in conflict with the constitution and statutes of
this state now or hereafter enacted, which the fiscal court shall deem requi-
site for the health, education, safety, welfare, and convenience of the inhab-
itants of the county and for the effective administration of the county gov-
ernment to the same extent as if the General Assembly had expressly granted
and delegated to the fiscal court all the authority that is within the power of
the General Assembly to grant to the fiscal court of said counties. (2) The
county judge is hereby authorized and empowered to exercise all of the exec-
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utive powers pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. (3) The powers
granted to counties by this Act shall be in addition to all other powers
granted to counties by other provisions of law. A permissive procedure
authorized by this Act shall not be deemed exclusive or to prohibit the exer-
cise of other existing laws and laws which may hereafter be enacted but still
be an alternative thereto.
Act of Mar. 27, 1972, ch. 384, 1972 Ky. Acts 1652. The 1978 General Assembly quickly
enacted a new home rule statute, to meet the objections of the Court. The 1978 Act, as
amended by the 1980 General Assembly, reads as follows:
(1) It is the purpose of this section to provide counties as units of
general purpose local government with the necessary latitude and flexibility
to provide and finance various governmental services within those function-
al areas specified in subsection (3) of this section, while the general assembly
retains full authority to prescribe and limit by statute local governmental ac-
tivities when it deems such action necessary.
(2) The fiscal court of any county is hereby authorized to levy all taxes
not in conflict with the Constitution and statutes of this state now or here-
after enacted.
(3) The fiscal court shall have the power to carry out governmental
functions necessary for the operation of the county. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by statute or the Kentucky Constitution, the fiscal court of any county
may enact ordinances, issue regulations, levy taxes, issue bonds, appropriate
funds and employ personnel in performance of the following public func-
tions: (a) Control of animals, and abatement of public nuisances; (b) Reg-
ulation of public gatherings; (c) Public sanitation and vector control; (d)
Provision of hospitals, ambulance service, programs for the health and wel-
fare of the aging and juveniles, and other public health facilities and ser-
vices; (e) Provision of corrections facilities and services, and programs for
the confinement, care and rehabilitation of juvenile law offenders; (0 Provi-
sion of parks, nature preserves, swimming pools, recreation areas, libraries,
museums and other recreational and cultural facilities and programs; (g)
Provision of cemeteries and memorials; (h) Conservation, preservation and
enhancement of natural resources including soils, water, air, vegetation and
wildlife; (i) Control of floods; (j) Causing the repair or demolition of struc-
tures which present a hazard to public health, safety or morals or are other-
wise inimical to the welfare of residents of the county; causing the redevel-
opment of housing and related commercial, industrial and service facilities
in urban or rural areas; providing education and counseling services and
technical assistance to present and future residents of publicly assisted hous-
ing; (k) Planning, zoning and subdivision control according to the provisions
of KRS Chapter 100; (l) Adoption, by reference or in full, of technical codes
governing new construction, renovation or maintenance of structures in-
tended for human occupancy; (in) Regulation of commerce for the protec-
tion and convenience of the public; (n) Regulation of the sale of alcoholic
beverages according to the provisions of KRS Chapters 241 through 244; (o)
Exclusive management of solid wastes by ordinance or contract or by both
and disposition of abandoned vehicles; (p) Provision of public buildings, in-
cluding armories, necessary for the effective delivery of public services; (q)
Cooperation with other units of government and private agencies for the
provision of public services, including but not limited to training, education-
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al services and cooperative extension service programs; (r) Provision of water
and sewage and garbage disposal service but not gas or electricity; including
management of onsite sewage disposal systems; (s) Licensing or franchising
of cable television; (t) Provision of streets and roads, bridges, tunnels and re-
lated facilities, elimination of grade crossings, provision of parking facilities,
enforcement of traffic and parking regulations; (u) Provision of police and
fire protection; (v) Regulation of taxis, buses and other passenger vehicles for
hire; (w) Provision and operation of air, rail and bus terminals, port facil-
ities, and public transportation systems; (x) Promotion of economic devel-
opment of the county, directly or in cooperation with public and private
agencies, including the provision of access roads, land and buildings, and
promotion of tourism and conventions; (y) Preservation of historic struc-
tures.
(4) The county judge/executive is hereby authorized and empowered to
exercise all of the executive powers pursuant to this section.
(5) A county acting under authority of this section may assume, own,
possess and control assets, rights and liabilities related to the functions and
services of the county.
(6) If a county is authorized to regulate an area which the state also
regulates, the county government may regulate the area only by enacting or-
dinances which are consistent with state law or administrative regulation.
(a) If the state statute or administrative regulation prescribes a single stan-
dard of conduct, a county ordinance is consistent if it is identical to the state
statute or administrative regulation. (b) If the state statute or administrative
regulation prescribes a minimal standard of conduct, a county ordinance is
consistent if it establishes a standard which is the same as or more stringent
than the state standard. (c) A county government may adopt ordinances
which incorporate by reference state statutes and administrative regulations
in areas in which a county government is authorized to act.
(7) County ordinances which prescribe penalties for their violation
shall be enforced throughout the entire area of the county unless: (a) Other-
wise provided by statute, or (b) The legislative body of any city within the
county has adopted an ordinance pertaining to the same subject matter
which is the same as or more stringent than the standards that are set forth
in the county ordinance. The fiscal court shall forward a copy of each ordi-
nance which is to be enforced throughout the entire area of the county to the
mayor or chairman of the board of trustees of each city in the county.
(8) The powers granted to counties by this section shall be in addition
to all other powers granted to counties by other provisions of law. A permis-
sive procedure authorized by this section shall not be deemed to be exclusive
or to prohibit the exercise of other existing laws and laws which may here-
after be enacted but shall be an alternative or supplement thereto.
(9) Any agency or county government exercising authority pursuant to
subsection (3)(y) of this section shall, prior to exercising such authority, ob-
tain the voluntary written consent of the owner of the structure. Consent
may be obtained only after advising the owner in writing of any advantages
and disadvantages to the owner which are likely to result from the exercise
of such authority.
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powers to cities except those it specifically denies to them.24
In Kentucky, the constitution grants no direct authority to
cities, but instead vests plenary power over cities in the General
Assembly.2 5 One can view home rule as a bridge to the Kentucky
Constitution, permitting cities to bypass the General Assembly
and derive their powers directly from the constitution. The Gen-
eral Assembly, however, retains absolute control over cities be-
cause it may specifically deny any power which would otherwise
be contained in the home rule grant.
2. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 82.082:
Kentucky's Home Rule Provision
The heart of the new municipal code is the home rule provi-
sion. Without that law the rest of the provisions would be practi-
cally impossible to implement because they are functionally de-
pendent upon the city having the broad discretionary authority
which only home rule can provide.
The home rule grant, codified as KRS section 82.082, is
rather brief:
(1) A city may exercise any power and perform any func-
tion within its boundaries, including the power of eminent do-
main in accordance with the provisions of the Eminent Do-
Act of Mar. 28, 1978, ch. 118, § 3, 1978 Ky. Acts 275, 277, as amended by Act of Apr. 3,
1980, ch. 149, § 3, 1980 Ky. Acts 393, 394 (codified as amended at KRS § 67.083 (1980)).
24 There are two basic models for home rule grants. The imperio in imperium model
grants cities autonomy over local affairs and prohibits the state legislature from intruding
into that area of local affairs. Local enactments then need to be consistent with state law
only on matters involving statewide concern. The imperio model has been discarded in re-
cent years and most home rule grants today, including Kentucky's home rule statutes, are
based upon the legislative supremacy model. In "supremacy" statutes the legislature dele-
gates to cities all possible municipal powers, subject to withdrawal or alteration by statute
or constitution. Vardandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA
(NLC) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. BEv. 1 (1975).
2- Ky. CONST. § 156. There have been attempts to revise the Kentucky Constitution
and grant constitutional home rule to local governments. Most recently, in 1966, the Con-
stitutional Revision -Assembly proposed a new constitution which would have contained
the following legislative supremacy home rule grant: "Units of local government may
create any democratic form of government or perform any functions not denied to them
by the Constitution, by law or by their own charters." LEcISLATiVE RESEARCH CoMIS-
SION, INFORMATIONAL BULLETION No. 52, A COMPARuSON-THE PRESENT, THE PROPOSED
KEN rucKY CoNnTrrnoN 60 (1966).
[Vol. 70
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main Act of Kentucky, that is in furtherance of a public pur-
pose of the city and not in conflict with a constitutional provi-
sion or statute.
(2) A power or function is in conflict with a statute if it is
expressly prohibited by a statute or there is a comprehensive
scheme of legislation on the same general subject embodied in
the Kentucky Revised Statutes including, but not limited to,
the provisions of KRS Chapters 95 and 96.2
KRS section 82.082 is still virgin territory for Kentucky's
courts. In fact, no Kentucky court has yet squarely faced the
question of municipal home rule. A county home rule statute
similar to KRS section 82.082 was found to be constitutionally in-
firm but, as shall be discussed below, the traditional differences
between the nature of cities and counties make that case a du-
bious precedent for municipal home rule.
KRS section 82.082 contains three basic limitations on the ex-
ercise of municipal powers. First, an exercise must be "in fur-
therance of a public purpose;" second, an exercise may not take
place outside the boundaries of the city; and third, the exercise
may not be "in conflict with a constitutional provision or sta-
tute."v
To take the easiest limitation first, home rule powers may be
exercised only within the corporate boundaries of the city. Any
extraterritorial exercise of powers must be pursuant to a specific
statutory grant of power.28
The "in furtherance of a public purpose" limitation is more
difficult to apply because it injects a new concept into municipal
law. Under the old "specific power grant" system, there was sel-
dom a need to consider whether an action furthered a public pur-
pose. The inquiry instead was whether the action in question was
in accordance with statutory authority. When the question of
public purpose has been raised, Kentucky courts have seldom ex-
plained their reasoning but have generally blithely passed over
2 KRS § 82.082 (1980).
27KRS § 82.082(1) (1980).
2 See, e.g., KRS § 96.190 (1982) (a city may construct utility facilities outside the
city); K1S § 96A.020 (1982) (a city may provide mass transit service outside of its transit
area if it shows necessity or public convenience); KRS § 104.030 (1982) (a city may con-
struct a flood control system outside the city).
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this issue on their way to the dispositive issue of the case. 29 No
clear-cut understanding of "public purpose" is discernable from
the cases, since courts seem to deal with the question in a strictly
case-by-case fashion.e Basically, the phrase means what it says
on its face. The governmental act must further the interests of
the residents of the city at large, not just those of a few. 31 It is
doubtful that the public purpose language will constitute much
of a limitation on the exercise of municipal powers.
The significant limitation on the exercise of municipal
powers is the requirement that an exercise not be in conflict with
a constitutional provision or statute. This limitation allows the
General Assembly to retain absolute control over municipalities
in the Commonwealth. Thus a local action can, in effect, be re-
pealed by statute. This approach does not represent a new con-
cept because state legislation has always been considered superior
to local legislation. 32 As the Kentucky Court of Appeals (now the
Kentucky Supreme Court) stated in 1970: "It is a fundamental
principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict
with a state law of general character and state-wide application
is universally held to be invalid."33
-9 A typical example is presented in a case where the Court was asked to determine if
"take-home" police cars were a proper use of public property. The Court quickly dis-
pensed with the public purpose issue by declaring: "To take the easy phrase first, there can
be little doubt but that the police automobiles are used by the city for purely 'public pur-
poses.'" Thomas v. Elizabethtown, 403 S.W.2d 269, 271-72 (Ky. 1965).
30 See, e.g., Youtsey v. County Debt Comm'n, 501 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. 1973); In-
dustrial Dev. Auth. v. Eastern Ky. Regional Planning Comm'n, 332 S.W.2d 274, 276-77
(Ky. 1960).
31 See City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979). In McCormick,
the Court attempted to distinguish "public purpose" from "public use" without really de-
fining either term. It appears that the Court determined that public purpose is a broader
concept than public use because it may encompass an act which only incidentally benefits
the public. See also Smith v. City of Kuttawa, 1 S.W.2d 979 (Ky. 1928) (quoting In
re Mayor of New York, 2 N.E. 642 (N.Y. 1885). In Smith, the Court approved the follow-
ing definition of public purpose: "[Ilt is impossible to formulate a perfect definition
of what is meant by a city purpose .... The purpose must be primarily the benefit, use,
or convenience of the city as distinguished from that of the public outside of it." 1 S.W.2d
at 982.
32 See C. RHYNE, supra note3, § 19.11, at 454.
33 Boyle v. Campbell, 450 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Ky. 1970) (quoting 37 AM. JuR. Munic-
ipal Corps. § 165 (1941)).
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The drafters of KRS section 82.082 attempted to codify the
common law rule of state supremacy over local governments,
legislatively defining "conflict" in section (2) of the statute. That
section states: "A power or function is in conflict with a statute if
it is expressly prohibited by a statute or there is a comprehensive
scheme of legislation on the same general subject embodied in the
Kentucky Revised Statutes including, but not limited to, the pro-
visions of KRS Chapters 95 and 96."34
It is unclear if the courts will feel bound by this legislative re-
statement of a judicially formulated rule of statutory construc-
tion. Since the definition so closely parallels the common law
rule, it may well be ignored and the courts may continue recon-
ciling clashes between local governments and the state in accor-
dance with the common law principles already developed.
Two types of clashes are recognized by both KRS section
82.082(2) and the common law. First and most obvious are the
situations where a local government attempts to perform some
act which is expressly forbidden by a state statutory or constitu-
tional provision. This is called a grammatical conflict. As formu-
lated by the Kentucky courts, this type of conflict exists "between
an ordinance and a statute when the ordinance permits conduct
which is prohibited by the statute."5
The second and more troublesome type of conflict occurs
when a local entity attempts to legislate regarding a subject on
which there exists state legislation. With grammatical conflicts
one merely lays the ordinance and the statute together and, if a
conflict is apparent, the ordinance must give way to the statute;
nevertheless, where the local body and the General Assembly
have legislated on the same general subject, even though there is
no apparent grammatical conflict, one must look beyond the sur-
face to the intent of the legislature. If the state legislation is a
"comprehensive scheme" or can be said to have "occupied the
field," the local ordinance will have to give way even though on
its face it does not conflict with the state statute. As Kentucky's
highest court stated in 1942: "An ordinance may cover an author-
ized field of local laws not occupied by general laws,
KRS § 82.082(2) (1980).
15 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1972).
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but... may not run counter to the public policy of the state as
declared by the legislature."36
The doctrine of pre-emption recognizes that there are in-
stances where the state intends its legislation to be the final word
on a subject with no room for supplementation by local legisla-
tion. The doctrine of pre-emption has not developed very
thoroughly in Kentucky because as long as municipal powers
were parcelled out bit by bit there was little opportunity for a
city to run afoul of state legislation. Thus it is not very clear what
the Court means when it speaks of the General Assembly "occu-
pying the field." In Boyle v. Campbell,37 the Court said that state
legislation must be deemed to have pre-empted any local legisla-
tion when "[t]he subject matter was fully and completely covered
by [the] general law which expressed a state-wide public policy
and by its terms indicated a paramount state concern not requir-
ing or contemplating local action."38 The Boyle Court failed to
lay out any tests for determining when this standard has been
met. It did, however, cite with approval a California case, In re
Hubbard,39 which provides a more detailed discussion of state
pre-emption.
The Hubbard court laid out the initial premise that as long as
there is no direct grammatical conflict, local legislation is permis-
sible to supplement or further the purposes of state legislation on
the same subject unless the state legislation has occupied the
field. 40 The court then set out three situations where it would
find that state legislation precluded local legislation. The Cali-
fornia court also implied that the presumption was against the
state legislation being deemed to have occupied the field.41 It
stated that state legislation has not occupied the field and pre-
cluded local legislation on the same subject unless:
(1) the subject matter has been so fully and completely covered
by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become exclu-
sively a matter of state concern; (2) the subject matter has been
36 City of Harlan v. Scott, 162 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Ky. 1942).
37 450 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1970).
38 Id. at 267.
39 396 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1964).
40 Id. at 812.
41 Id. at 814-15.
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partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to
indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not toler-
ate further or additional local action; or (3) the subject matter
has been partially covered by general law, and the subject is of
such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit to
the municipality.42
When state legislation is intended to occupy the field, a city
has no power to enact local legislation on the subject. As the
Boyle Court stated: "[Wlhere the state has occupied the field of
prohibitory legislation on a particular subject, a municipality
lacks authority to legislate with respect thereto." 43 It necessarily
follows that the city lacks any power to legislate on the subject
even if the local legislation is identical to the state legislation.
While the language of KRS section 82.082(2) speaks of state legis-
lation which is a "comprehensive scheme" rather than of "occu-
pying the field," it is clear that the drafters intended that phrase
to embody the pre-emption theory developed by the courts. 4
The effect of the home rule legislation may yet be far-
reaching4 s but, in the short time it has been in effect, it has had
little impact on how cities operate. Of the approximately 430
cities in Kentucky, 46 only two have full-time mayors and none
have full-time legislative bodies. 47 Most city attorneys are prac-
42 Id. at 815.
43 450 S.W.2d at 267 (citing 62 CJ.S. Municipal Corps. § 143(3) (1949)).
44 See KRS § 82.082(2) (1980). The statute lists two examples of comprehensive
schemes: KRS chapter 95, relating to municipal police and fire departments, and KRS
chapter 96, relating to municipal utilities. Id. It is possible that the courts could examine
these chapters and conclude that they are not true examples of "comprehensive schemes"
or "occupying the field" as the courts have developed those terms. For example, if the
courts were to conclude that those chapters were mentioned not so much because they are
clearly comprehensive schemes but because of pressure from interest groups, they might
not feel bound by the legislative pronouncement that these two chapters are "comprehen-
sive schemes of legislation." See id.
4 5 Some of the more common benefits touted for home rule are that it will "[dle-
crease state meddling and interference in the internal affairs of cities. .; [allow cities to
better fashion individual solutions to their unique problems; and [e]ncourage experimen-
tation which may ultimately lead to improvement in local government." THE NEW Mu-
NICIPAL LAW, supra note 11, at 15.46 TOWARD A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 15, at 9.
47 See OFFICE FOR RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND
ECONOMICS, CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PERSONNEL DATA FOR KENTUCKY MUNICIPAL-
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ticing attorneys for whom the city is just one of many clients.
This amateur nature of city government tends to limit innovation
and initiative because few city officials have the time or resources
to do other than follow the way things have always been done in
the city where they serve. Thus it is reasonable to expect that it
will take time for most city officials to adjust to the freedom, and
the correlative responsibilities, of home rule.
3. Constitutionality of Home Rule
Home rule could be "nipped in the bud" before cities ever be-
come aware of its potential. Kentucky courts have not treated
legislative attempts to grant home rule to local governments very
favorably, but instead have shown hostility or, more commonly,
incomprehension. The first time a home rule statute came before
the Supreme Court it was ruled unconstitutional. In 1977 in Fis-
cal Court of Jefferson County v. City of Louisville,48the Supreme
Court declared KRS section 67.083, 49 granting home rule to
counties, an overbroad delegation of legislative authority. In a
memorable turn of phrase, Justice Jones stated: "[W]hile the
General Assembly may grant governmental powers to counties it
must do so with the precision of a rifle shot and not with the
casualness of a shot gun blast."0 The General Assembly was
quick to react and in 1978 enacted a new "rifle shot" home rule
statute to meet the objections of the Court. 5'
It does not necessarily follow that the Supreme Court will
rule on the municipal home rule statute in the same fashion. The
distinction, although somewhat blurred in the decision, 52 lies in
ruEs (Fall 1978) (statistics set out the number of hours worked by mayors and legislative
bodies).
48 559 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1977).
49 KtS § 67.083 (amended 1978). See note 23 supra for the text of the 1972 Act.
50 559 S.W.2d at 482.
51 KRS § 67.083 (1980). See note 23 supra for the text of the 1978 Act as currently co-
dified.52 The distinction is blurred because the Court, while generally being careful to limit
its ruling to counties, unfortunately supported its ruling by citing a commentary which
reads "counties and cities." Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. City of Louisville, 559
S.W.2d at 482.
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the different nature of city and county government. The Court in
Fiscal Court appeared to intend to limit its ruling to counties
since it pointed out that,
historically counties, although containing municipalities, have
existed primarily to perform state functions... and to pro-
vide governmental services to rural areas; whereas municipal-
ities have existed to supply the governmental needs of compact
urban areas. Municipalities have been delegated vast authority
to exercise the police power ... and consequently the range of
municipal functions greatly exceeds that of county functions. S'
It is certainly reasonable to infer from this language that the
Court would permit a far broader delegation of powers to cities
than it would to counties.
The Fiscal Court case is interesting, nevertheless, for it shows
that the Supreme Court is really not comfortable with the idea of
delegating broad authority to local governments. The Court
cited no authority to support its contention that a broad grant of
authority to counties is unconstitutional. Rather it made the
statement that, "[i]n essence, this court views such overly broad
delegation of powers of the General Assembly to fiscal courts as a
'quitclaim deed' to all its powers." Notwithstanding the fact
that the statute could in no way be termed a quitclaim deed,55
since the General Assembly still retained its power to limit.
county powers by statute, no reason is given to support the
Court's statement that a quit claim deed would be impermissi-
ble. In support of its decision, the Court cites a Kentucky govern-
53 Id. at 480 (quoting LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, INFORMATIONAL BULLE-
TIN No. 36, THE CONSTITUTION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 9 (1964)). The Court is referring
to the doctrine that counties are merely
quasi-municipal corporations organized as subordinate agencies of the state
government whose purpose is to aid in the proper administration of state af-
fairs with such powers and functions as are prescribed by law. Hence coun-
ties differ from municipal corporations proper which are created primarily
for the advantage and convenience of the people within their boundaries.
C. RHYNE ,supra note3, § 1.5, at 5-6.
4 559 S.W.2d at 481.
5 "Quitclaim deed" is defined as "[a] deed of conveyance operating by way of re-
lease; that is, intended to pass any title, interest, or claim which the grantor may have in
the premises, but not professing that such title is valid, nor containing any warranty or
covenants for title." BLACicS LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (5th ed. 1979).
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ment agency report that power must be expressly delegated to
counties.56 That report really offers little support, however, for
the phrase "expressly delegated" does not go to the issue of how
specific that delegation need be. A commentary published soon
after the Fiscal Court case pointed out that the reasons given in
opposition to county home rule were not so much legal as vis-
ceral:
It is significant that the court cites no cases in support of its tra-
ditional premise that all power must be expressly delegated to
it by statute. Surely the history and traditions of the Common-
wealth are important as guideposts and are not to be ignored
without sound reasons. But at the same time the past should
not prevent the legislature and courts from embarking upon a
new course for the future merely because it differs from the
traditional manner. The county governments must now deal
with vastly different problems than they were required to do in
past decades, and the legislature responded to this change by
granting the fiscal courts broad power under section 67.083. In
its decision, the court did not explain why history and tradition
prevented broad grants of power to county governments, but
simply stated that it did so.57
The Court's next opportunity to interpret a home rule statute
arose in Stansbury v. Maupin,s but the Court neatly side-
stepped the issue. Stansbury arose out of a controversy between
the mayor and the legislative body in the City of Louisville. The
Board of Aldermen sought to subpoena the Mayor over alleged
wrongdoings on his part. The Mayor challenged the Board's
power of subpoena. One basis cited by the Board to support its
authority to subpoena was KRS section 83.520, the home rule
statute for cities of the first class., 9 The decision shows that home
rule has a long way to go before it is accepted or even understood
by Kentucky's courts. The Stansbury Court ignored KRS section
83.520 and, by ignoring it, seriously endangered its vitality. The
Court dispensed with the home rule statute by stating that it
56559 S.W.2d at 481 (quoting LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, INFOMIATIONAL
BULLETIN No. 115, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN KENTUcKY (1976)).
57 Note, Fiscal Court v. Louisville, 5 N. KY. L. REv. 107, 118-19 (1980).
5 599 S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1980).
" See note 22 supra for the text of KRS § 83.520.
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agreed "with the Court of Appeals that.., the city 'home rule'
act, does not include" the subpoena power. ® However, the deci-
sion of the court of appeals merely contained a blanket statement
that "KRS 83.520, insofar as it pertains to this case involving the
right to subpoena, administer oaths or investigate, confers no
power upon the legislative body of the city to do so." 61 Neither
court explained the conclusion any further. The problem the Su-
preme Court was having with home rule is readily evidenced by
its statement that "[tihe authority to subpoena witnesses and
compel them to give evidence is too powerful, and too susceptible
of abuse, to be implied in the absence of utter necessity." 62 By
talking about implied powers, the Court was falling back on the
old Dillon's Rule method of analyzing municipal powers.
The implied powers doctrine was a legal fiction developed to
mitigate the harshness of Dillon's Rule.6 To hold cities strictly to
the powers expressly granted would be practically impossible be-
cause the performance of a function might require preparatory
acts not allowed for in the enabling legislation. Thus the implied
powers concept was intended to fill in the gaps which might exist
in authorizing legislation. One commentator has cited the fol-
lowing "[e]xamples of express grants of power" which courts
have found to carry implied power:
power to operate a utility system includes the power to sell fix-
tures; to incur debt for building jails authorizes purchase of
land upon which to situate them; to issue bonds implies the
power to refund them; to maintain parks includes the power to
operate a nursery; and the power to purchase real estate im-
plies the power to assume indebtedness therefor. 4
Through the grant of home rule, the General Assembly made
the implied powers doctrine unnecessary. There are no longer
'0 599 S.W.2d at 172.
61 Maupin v. Stansbury, No. 79-CA-108-MR, slip op. at 7 (Ky. Ct. App., Aug. 3,
1979) (unpublished).
62 Stansburyv. Maupin, 599 S.W.2d at 171.
6 "The term 'implied powers' designates those powers which arise by natural impli-
ction from the grant of express powers, or by necessary inference from the purposes and
functions of the municipality." C. RHYNE, supra note 3, § 4.7, at 65.
64 C. RHYNE, Mutcniai. LAw § 4.7, at 71-72 (1957).
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any unexplained gaps in municipal powers because home rule
grants a city all possible municipal powers except those expressly
withheld by the legislature. The Stansbury Court failed to grasp
the elementary fact that it has only three options when ruling on
a municipal power: (1) uphold the exercise of the power; (2)
point to a statute which conflicts with and therefore forbids the
power;65 or (3) strike down the home rule statute as unconstitu-
tional.
By not exercising any of these options, the Supreme Court
put home rule in a state of legal limbo. In effect, by neither find-
ing home rule unconstitutional nor identifying any conflicting
statutes, but still refusing to allow a city to exercise the power in
question, the Court is substituting its own opinion of what is an
appropriate city power for the General Assembly's opinion. 6 Sec-
tion 156 of the Kentucky Constitution grants the General Assem-
bly sole responsibility for fashioning the powers of cities.6s It is
6 See the text accompanying notes 33-44 supra for a discussion of types of statutory
conflicts.
6 The common reason for the Court's denial of home rule in bath Stansbury and Fis-
cal Court was that the Court thought the proposed activities in both cases were improper
and inappropriate. In Fiscal Court, the Court worried about the consequences which
would follow if counties could enforce their ordinances pursuant to home rule within the
boundaries of cities:
This position would create numerous problems .... The overly broad grant
of authority to fiscal courts would magnify those problems.... In baseball
parlance, it would be difficult for the citizenry, as well as officers of the mu-
nicipalities to ascertain whose turn it was at bat. No one could ever tell who
was "on first." The problems created would be sufficient for the citizens of
municipalities, as well as those of unincorporated areas to" 'Cry Havoc' and
let slip the dogs of war."
559 S.W.2d at 481 (citing William Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. In Stansbury, the Court
gave the following reason why it felt the subpoena power was not "implied":
The authority to subpoena witnesses and compel them to give evidence
is too powerful, and too susceptible of abuse, to be implied in the absence of
utter necessity. It is a tool of inquisition, short only of the rack and screw.
Even in the hands of a grand jury it can be and sometimes is used in a man-
ner so oppressive as to seem inconsistent with the high value of individual
liberty which is traditional in this country.
599 S.W.2d at 171.
67 Ky. CONST. § 156 reads in part:
The organization and powers of each class shall be defined and provided for
by general laws, so that all municipal corporations of the same class shall
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the responsibility of the General Assembly to determine the wis-
dom of legislation; the Court should be concerned only with
whether the law is in accord with the constitution. By acting as it
did in Fiscal Court and Stansbury, the Court was guilty of for-
getting its own warning that
"[c]ourts should be extremely careful to accord to the Legisla-
ture the power to exercise those matters of discretion which are
preserved to it by the Constitution. Thus the wisdom or folly of
Legislative enactments within constitutional bounds, may not
be weighed in judicial construction of a statute free of ambigu-
ity."68
4. City of Radcliff v. Hardin Countys
Only one decision to date has attempted to construe KRS sec-
tion 82.082. In City of Radcliff v. Hardin County,70 the court of
appeals was asked to referee a conflict between city and county
governments over who had the power to franchise garbage col-
lection. A number of other issues were involved, but of interest to
the present inquiry is the question whether KRS section 67.083
(the county home rule statute) granted exclusive jurisdiction to
the county for the management of solid waste. The county
pointed to a subsection of KRS section 67.083 providing that a
county is to have "[e]xclusive management of solid wastes by
ordinance or contract or by both."71 The court ruled that the
county did not have exclusive powers in the area of waste dispo-
sa72 and dragged in KRS section 82.082 to justify its decision in a
rather unusual fashion. As discussed above, the county home rule
possess the same powers and be subject to the same restrictions .... The
General Assembly shall assign the cities and towns of the Commonwealth to
the classes to which they respectively belong, and change assign-
ments .... The General Assembly, by a general law, shall provide how
towns may be organized, and enact laws for the government of such towns
until the same are assigned to one or the other of the classes above
named....
68 Clarkv. Riehl, 230 S.W.2d 626, 628-29 (Ky. 1950).
6' 607 S.W.2d 132 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
70 Id.
71 KRS § 67.083(3)(o) (1980). See note 23 supra for the complete text of KRS §
67.083.
72 City of Radcliffv. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d at 136.
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statute is of the legislative supremacy type and therefore contains
the following exception to its laundry list of powers: "except as
otherwise provided by statute or the Kentucky Constitution."73
The court determined that KRS section 82.082 "otherwise pro-
vided" that cities could franchise waste collection 74 because prior
to the enactment of the Code there had been a specific grant of
the authority to franchise garbage collection to cities. 75 Even
though the statute had been repealed, the court treated it as still
existing through the enactment of KRS section 82.082 and there-
by "otherwise providing." As the court of appeals stated: "This
section supplants KRS section 94.282 and does not take away the
powers formerly granted the cities. Therefore, we hold that
under KRS 82.082 the cities still have the power over collection
of garbage within their limits." 76
The court was wrong in its analysis because it failed to take
into account that the powers granted by KRS section 82.082 also
must not conflict with a statute.77 In essence the court of appeals'
analysis was backward. The inquiry should not have been whe-
ther KRS section 82.082 "otherwise provided," but whether KRS
section 67.083(3)(o) conflicted with the city's exercise of its
powers. The court's statement that home rule "does not take
away the powers formerly granted cities" 7 was incorrect. The
statute does grant all possible municipal powers, but subject to
statutory withdrawal. 79 Radcliff presented a situation of duelling
home rule statutes, one specifically listing powers 0 and the other
generally describing the powers. 81 The city statute won, but the
court did not allow a fair fight. While it is true, as the court
stated, that home rule was designed to supplant the specific sta-
73 KRS § 67,083(3) (1980).
74 607 S.W.2d at 135.
75 See KRS § 94.282, repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 239, § 4, 1980 Ky. Acts
729,730.
76 City of Radcliffv. Hardin County, 607 S.W.2d at 136.
77 See KRS § 82.082(1) (1980).
78 607 S.W.2d at 136.
79 See the text accompanying notes 34-44 supra for a discussion of legislative limita-
tions on home rule.
80 KRS § 67.083 (1980) (the county home rule statute).
81 KRS § 82.082 (1980) (the municipal home rule statute).
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tutes it repdaled, it is not true that, because a specific statute had
permitted the power, ipso facto home rule allows the power. The
court erred seriously in not inquiring as to whether KRS section
67.083(3)(o) conflicted with the exercise of the power to fran-
chise garbage collections.
It is evident that home rule seems a very strange animal in-
deed to Kentucky courts. They really have not figured out what
to do with it, and have persisted in trying to clothe it in tradition-
al garb, with little success. Home rule can be an important and
vital tool for Kentucky's cities, and the General Assembly has
taken the giant step of entrusting cities with the power it feels is
necessary for them to function. The courts, assuming there is
nothing constitutionally impermissible about home rule, should
attempt to come to grips with the concept so that cities can begin
to take advantage of it.
II. MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROCEDURE
No matter how broad and far-reaching the powers granted a
municipality, they can be utilized effectively only if there exists
an organized and efficient government to wield them. Once the
drafters of the Code decided that home rule should be granted to
cities, they studied the existing statutes which established the or-
ganization and structure of Kentucky's cities. 82 They found that:
In substance, the functions required of cities under exist-
ing law are generally the same regardless of class. However,
the methods by which functions are to be performed varies
[sic] from class to class. Some classes may perform functions in
ways not available to other classes. For example, in the assign-
ment of roles to specified officers, titles vary, selection proce-
dures vary and division of work varies from one class to
another, specified officers with the same titles have totally dif-
ferent responsibilities and specified officers with the same or
similar responsibilities have different titles. 3
82 The author is the Committee Staff Administrator for the Standing Committee on
Cities in the Kentucky General Assembly and thus has first hand knowledge of the
drafters' procedures.
i TOWARD A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 15, at 14.
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Because such diversity no longer seemed necessary, the
drafters decided the existing charter chapters for cities should be
repealed and replaced with a single chapter providing uniform
organizational plans for cities regardless of class. The new plans
would not have to be as specific as the plans they replaced. In-
stead they would set out in broad outline the structure of the city
government, to be filled in through the enactment of ordinances
to meet the needs of the particular city. 4
A. Forms of Municipal Government
There are three basic forms of mtinicipal government com-
mon in the United States: the mayor-council plan, the commis-
sion plan, and the city manager plan.,- All three plans call for the
same elected officials, a mayor and a legislative body, to run the
government. The plans differ, however, in the distribution of
powers between the two branches. Prior to enactment of the
Code, Kentucky statutes authorized all three forms of govern-
ment. The mayor-council plan was standard, although a differ-
ent version existed for each class of city. There were two commis-
sion plans, one available to cities of the second, third and fourth
classes, and the other available to cities of the fifth and sixth
classes."
The Code provides a uniform mayor-council plan (except for
cities of the first class), 87 a uniform commission plan, s and a uni-
form city manager plan.89 All plans are available for adoption by
8 Id. This is the so-called optional charter system where the state draws up a variety
of organizational plans or charters, and permits a city to choose the charter best suited to
its needs.
8 See THE NEW MUNICIPAL LAW, supra note 11, at 2-12.
86 See note 17 supra and the text accompanying notes 45-47 supra for a discussion of
the part-time nature of municipal government in Kentucky.
87 KRS § 83A.130 (1980). Cities of the first class continue to be organized pursuant
to KRS chapter 83, but the plan provided is a strong mayor plan very similar to the Code
mayor-council plan. The mayor is the chief executive officer. The legislative powers are
vested in a twelve member unicameral council called the Board of Aldermen. Except for
KRS § 83A.130, the provisions of KRS chapter 83A apply to cities of the first class unless
specifically excepted. See THE NEW MUNICIPAL LAW, supra note 11, at 70 for further dis-
cussion.
8' KRS § 83A.140 (1980).
89 KRS § 83A.150 (1980).
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all classes of cities. 0 In addition, the Code permits the establish-
ment of a city administrative officer in any city regardless of
which plan it uses. 91 When the Code became effective on July 15,
1980, existing city charters were repealed. Cities of the second
through the fifth class, which had been mayor-council cities, are
now governed by the Code mayor-council plan.2 All cities which
had operated under the old city manager plan now operated
under the Code city manager plan. 93 All cities which had oper-
ated under the old commission plan, and cities of the sixth class
which operated under the old board-of-trustees plan, are now
operating under the Code commission plan.9 4 If the transition
necessitated a change in the number of members on the city legis-
lative body, a city had two years from July 15, 1980 to comply.9-
1. Mayor-Council Plan
There are two basic subtypes of mayor-council governments,
the strong mayor-council model and the weak mayor-council
model. In the first model, the mayor is the chief executive officer
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the city; the council is
confined to a strictly legislative role. In the latter model, the
line of demarcation between executive and legislative functions is
blurred, especially with respect to executive functions. Those
functions are shared by the mayor, the legislative body, and
often by separately elected officers such as a clerk, a treasurer, or
a controller.97 Under the old law, Kentucky's mayor-council
plans ran the gamut from strong mayor in cities of the first class,
to an extremely weak mayor in cities of the sixth class.98 The
90 KRS § 83A.160 (1980).
9' KRS § 83A.090 (1980). Any city may create the position of city administrative of-
ficer. The officer shall be employed by the executive authority to assist in the administra-
tion of the city. The qualifications required of the officer shall include "professional train-
ing and experience in administration sufficient to insure competence." KRS § 83A.090(1)
(1980).
92 KRS § 83A.020(1) (1980).93 Id.
94 Id.
"s KRS § 83A.030 (1980). See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-439 (Aug. 12, 1980).
9 NATIONAL MuwNiaAL LEAcuE, FoRms OF MuNIcnAL GOVERNMENT 5 (1973).
97 Id. at 11.
98 Cities of the first class possess a very strong mayor plan. See note 87 and accom-
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Code allows all cities, not just the larger ones, the option of a
strong mayor plan.
The Code plan is a moderately strong mayor-weak council
plan. 99 The mayor is the chief executive officer of the city, and
the council is precluded from performing any executive function
except as provided by statute. 0 0 The mayor is the appointing au-
thority for all officers and employees, but appointments of offi-
cers must be ratified by the council.101 The mayor is responsible
for preparing the budget and for the day-to-day management of
the city. 102The mayor, subject to disapproval by the council, pro-
mulgates procedures for the orderly administration of city gov-
eriment.10 3
The city council is a unicameral legislative body composed of
from six to twelve members, depending on the city's class. 104 The
council is limited to performing purely legislative functions such
as enacting legislation to ensure the orderly operation of the
city. I0 The mayor possesses the right to veto any ordinance en-
panying text supra for the structure of the strong mayor plan. Cities of the second class had
a fairly strong mayor-council plan, except that the legislative body was a very large, un-
wieldy, bicameral body. Accordingly all cities of the second class used city manager plans.
Cities of the third and fourth classes had similar plans, wherein the balance of power had
swung to the council. These plans were characterized as weak mayor plans because the
council, not the mayor, appointed officers and employees. The plan that provided for
cities of the sixth class was actually a commission plan. The mayor (called the chairman)
was not separately elected, but was appointed from among the members of the council
(called the board of trustees). The mayor possessed no executive powers outside his posi-
tioras a member of the board of trustees. See THE NEw MUNICIPAL LAW, supra note 11, at
68.
99 See KRS § 83A.130 (1980).
100 KRS § 83A.130(3) (1980). See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-551 (Oct. 14,1980).
101 KRS § 83A.080(2) (1980); KRS § 83A.130(9) (1980). The mayor's appointment
powers do not extend to "employees of the council." KRS § 83A.130(9) (1980). The coun-
cil, however, may only employ persons to assist it in the performance of its legislative func-
tions. Such employees include a "clerk, bookkeeper, sergeant at arms, doorkeeper, secre-.
tarial help, legislative aide, attorney." Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-74 (Feb. 18,1981).
102 KRS § 91A.030(5) (1982). See KRS § 83A.130(3) (1980).
103 KRS § 83A.130(4) (1980).
104 KRS § 83A.030(1) (1980). In cities of the first class, the council is composed of
twelve members. In cities of the second through the fourth classes, the council is composed
of from six to twelve members as established by ordinance. In cities of the fifth and sixth
classes, the council consists of six members. Id.
10 KRS § 83A.130(11) (1980). Cf. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-273 (May 20, 1980)
(mayor supervises all city departments and chief administrative officer may be established
under mayoral supervision); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-468 (Aug. 22, 1980) (mayor may
delegate supervisory power to administrative officers or to subordinate officers).
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acted by the council, although his veto may be overridden by a
vote of a majority of the council plus one. 10 The mayor also pre-
sides over meetings of the council but he may not vote unless his
vote is necessary to break a tie.107
2. Commission Plan
The commission plan represents an entirely different ap-
proach to the management of city government than the mayor-
council plan. Under the commission plan, all legislative, exec-
utive, and administrative powers are vested in the legislative
body.108
The Code commission plan replaces two separate commission
plans. It was modeled closely after them, but drafted in broader
terms. °0 Under the Code plan, the city commission is composed
of four commissioners and the mayor."10 Other than his position
as a member of the commission the mayor has no statutory duties
and serves merely as the titular head of the city."' One of the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of a commission plan is that the com-
missioners individually serve as administrators of the various city
departments.12 The old plan set out what departments were to
be established in the city and how they were to be divided among
the commissioners.113 The Code is more flexible, and merely pro-
vides that the commission shall establish city departments and
designate which commissioners have supervision over each de-
'0 KRS § 83A.130(5) (1980).
107 Id.; Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-175 (Apr. 21,1981).
108 The commission plan was developed in 1901 after a tidal wave devastated the
city of Galveston, Texas. By vesting all executive, legislative, and administrative authority
in one body, that body could then quickly take the decisive action needed. The plan en-
joyed a brief vogue, but is now soundly criticized as an ineffective governmental plan.
One critic commented that "[tihe commission plan violates one of the fundamentals of
public administration by making no organizational distinction between the legisla-
tive... and the administrative... functions." PATE, LocAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMN-
isTRATIoN 202 (1954).
1o9 See KRS § 83A.140(3) (1980).
,1 KRS § 83A.140(2) (1980).
1 See KRS § 83A.130(4) (1980). The mayor executes bonds, notes, contracts, and
written obligations of the city, but his signing is purely a ministerial act. Id.
112 THE NEW MuNIcIPAL LAW, supra note 11, at 6.
113 KBS § 81.190, repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 303, § 15, 1980 Ky. Acts
1024, 1027; KRS § 89.180, repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 235, § 20, 1980 Ky. Acts
705,718.
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partment."14 In the alternative, the commission may delegate its
administrative duties to a city administrative officer. 5
As mentioned above, cities of the sixth class, which formerly
had been organized under the board-of-trustees plan provided by
KRS chapter 88, are now to be organized as commission plan
cities. 16 This change was probably made because the old board-
of-trustees plan more closely resembled a commission plan than a
mayor-council plan, and thus placing sixth class cities under the
commission plan would be less disruptive than placing them
under a mayor-council plan.
3. City Manager Plan
The last plan available to Kentucky cities is the city manager
plan.17 This plan is essentially a commission plan with the addi-
tion of the city manager, an appointed officer to administer the
affairs of the city."' All executive and legislative powers are
vested in the board of commissioners, composed of four commis-
sioners and the mayor." 9 The mayor has no substantive powers
outside his position as a member of the board of commissioners,' °
and the day-to-day operation of the city is to be administered by
a city manager appointed by the board.12' In a model city man-
ager plan, the manager possesses all the powers a mayor would
114 KRS § 83A.140(6) (1980).
115 Id.
116 KRS § 83A.020(l) (1980); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-439 (Aug. 12, 1980).
1 KRS § 83A.150(1) (1980).
118 KRS § 83A.150(8) & (9) (1980). The city manager plan continues to gain pop-
ularity for cities of medium and small size. The plan recognizes that the part-time and
amateur nature of local elected officials often results in poor public administration. The
Kentucky Court of Appeals (then the high court) extolled the virtues of the plan when it
affirmed a city manager plan's constitutionality:
This arrangement in operating government recognizes governmental ad-
ministration as a science and technique within itself. Indeed, it admits on its
face that politically elected or appointed officials, whose integrity and hon-
esty of purpose may be unquestioned, are frequently unsuited for adminis-
tering and executing the highly complicated and involved problems of the
modem city.
Rawlings v. City of Newport, 121 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Ky. 1938).
19 KtS § 83A.030(2) (1980); KRS § 83A.150(3) (1980).
no KRS § 83A.150(3) (1980).
121 See KRS § 83A.150(7) (1980).
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possess in a strong mayor-council plan. m The theory behind the
city manager plan is that the actual administration of a modern
city is too complex to be trusted to whomever is selected by the
democratic process, but instead should be undertaken by a per-
son trained and skilled in the art of municipal management. 23
The Code plan does not go as far as model plans would dictate,
however. Under the Code, the manager is given all the executive
and administrative powers of a mayor in a mayor-council plan
except for the two most important. First, the board is the ap-
pointing authority; 24 the manager may only recommend persons
for employment or dismissal. 23 Second, the manager may not
veto ordinances passed by the board. 2
The Code manager plan is virtually identical to the old man-
ager plan, which had been soundly criticized because it failed to
grant the authority which many felt was necessary for a city
manager plan. A 1959 study stated that "[a] reading of the pres-
ent council-manager law will lead to the conclusion that the law
no longer embodies the essential features of the city manager
plan, for under it, the manager's duties correspond more closely
to those of a chief administrative officer than to a bona fide city
manager."' 7 The reason given for this charge was that the man-
ager "lacks the requisite authority to make his own appoint-
ments, and must rely on the commission's prerogative to follow
or not to follow his recommendations."'2
A city may change its plan of government at any time, al-
though once it makes a change it may not do so again for a period
of five years. 29 The change must be approved by a majority of
the participating voters. 130 Under the old law, since each class
12 R. CHnLDS, THE FIRST 50 YEARS OF THE COUNCIL-MANAGER PLAN OF MUNICP'AL
GOVERNMENT 5 (1965).
123 See note 118 supra for a discussion of the city manager plan.
124 KRS § 83A.080(2) (1980); KRS § 83A.150(3) (1980).
125 KRS § 83A.150(7)(b) (1980).
.12 See KRS § 83A.150 (1980) (manager may not veto ordinances because there is no
grant of a veto power in the statute).
127 LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT RESEARCH
PUBLICATION No. 64, at 72-73 (1959).
128 LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN No. 96, KEN-
TUCKY GOVERNMENT 98 (7th ed. 1973).
'2 KRS § 83A.170(5) (1980).
130 KRS § 83A.160(1) (1980).
1981-82]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
had a separate charter, each class had different requirements for
qualifications for officers, different procedures for enactment of
legislation, and many other differences which seemingly had no
rational basis except to confuse.131 The Code, however, provides
uniform administrative procedures and standards regardless of
the form of government under which a city operates. 132
B. Municipal Officers
Under the Code, only two types of elected city officers are
permitted, a mayor and members of the city legislative body. 13 If
other elected offices existed at the time of the effective date of the
Code, they are to continue until abolished by ordinance. 134Under
the old law the qualifications for officers varied greatly from
class to class, but under the Code the qualifications are uniform.
To qualify for the office of mayor, a person shall: (1) be twenty-
five years of age; (2) be a qualified voter in the city; (3) reside in
the city for the duration of his term;1 5 and (4) not be interested in
any contract with the city (except in cities of the third class).3
The same qualifications apply to members of the city legislative
body except that the age requirement is twenty-one years.13
Mayors are elected for four year terms or until their succes-
131 Qualifications required of officers differed in each class; the procedures for enact-
ing ordinances differed; even the names assigned legislative bodies differed from class to
class (e.g., board of aldermen, board of councilmen, common council, city council, board
of trustees).
132 The uniform procedures and standards are set out in KRS §§ 83A.030-.120
(1980).
13' KRS § 83A.080(4) (1980).
134 KBS § 83A.080(3) (1980). .nder prior law, depending on a city's class, the fol-
lowing officers were either required or permitted to be elected: comptroller and inspector,
treasurer, assessor, attorney, marshal, clerk, collector, and chief of police. See THE NEav
MUNrCIAL LAW, supra note 11, at 6.
13
' KBS § 83A.040(1) (1980). A common requirement dispensed with in the Code is
that an officer must own real estate in the city. Such a requirement might not be constitu-
tional in light of recent interpretations of the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution. Cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) ("freeholder" requirement for
school board membership held to be in violation of the equal protection clause). No Ken-
tucky court has ruled on the question, although the Attorney General opined that such re-
quirements are unconstitutional. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 75-686 (Nov. 18,1975).
136 KRS §§ 61.260-.280 (1980).
is7 KBS § 83A.040(3) (1980).
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sors qualify, and members of legislative bodies are elected for
two year terms.1ss All elected officers commence their terms on
the first Monday in January following the year of their elec-
tion.139 Cities of the second class operating under the city man-
ager plan must elect officers on a non-partisan basis, but any city
may elect officers on a non-partisan basis if it obtains voter ap-
proval.140 Election of legislative body members may be staggered,
with one half being elected in one year and the other half being
elected in the next;14 1 otherwise all city officers are elected in
odd-numbered years. Any vacancy in an elected city office must
be filled by the legislative body of the city, 142 and, except in cities
138 KRS § 83A.040(l)-(3) (1980). The Kentucky Constitution permits mayors to hold
over in office "until their successors shall be qualified." KY. CONST. § 160. There is no
comparable language for city legislative body members; their terms may not extend be-
yond two years unless re-elected. See id. Mayors in cities of the first two classes are ineligi-
ble to succeed themselves, id.; mayors in all other classes of cities and members of legisla-
tive bodies may succeed themselves in office. See id.
139 KRS § 83A.040(1) & (3) (1980). This represents a change only for elected officers
in cities of the first class who, prior to the Code, took office on December 1 of the year in
which they were elected.
140 See KS § 83A.170 (1980). This provision has engendered a great deal of confu-
sion. Prior to the Code, only cities operating under city manager plans or commission
plans could conduct non-partisan elections. KRS § 83A.170 was designed to extend that
option to all cities. If a city adopts non-partisan elections, no candidate may run under a
party label. All nominees must run in a primary. The two candidates receiving the highest
number of votes for each office are then nominated to run in the general election. The con-
fusion was caused because, prior to the Code, many cities in Kentucky conducted de facto
non-partisan elections. Elections were conducted under the general election laws of KBS
chapters 118 and 119, but no one would file for party nominations in the primary elections
and all candidates would run as independents in the general election pursuant to KRS §
118.315 (1982). In fact, primary elections are prohibited by KRS § 118.105(4) for mem-
bers of legislative bodies in cities of the fifth and sixth classes, mayors and commissioners in
cities of the fourth class operating under the commission plan, and all officers in cities of
the second, third and fourth classes operating under the city manager plan. KBS §
118.105(4) (1982). The Code did not amend the general election laws and cities may still
conduct de facto non-partisan elections, as was done prior to the Code, without adopting
the provisions of KRS § 83A.170 (1980). See generally Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-322
(June4, 1980); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-43 (Feb. 6, 1981); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-
79 (Feb. 23, 1981); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-163 (May 4, 1981); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No.
81-221 (June 12,1981); Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-279 (Aug. 3, 1981).
141 KRS § 83A.110 (1980). Staggered elections may be adopted only if approved by
the voters of the city pursuant to the public question procedure of KRS § 83A. 120 (1980).
142 KRS § 83A.040(2), (4) (1980). Vacancies must be filled within 30 days of occur-
rence or they will be filled by gubernatorial appointment. KRS § 83A.040(5) (1980). If
there is more than one vacancy on the legislative body, the vacancies must be filled one at
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of the first class, any elected official may be removed for reasons
of "misconduct, inability, or willful neglect in the performance
of the duties of his office."' 43 The compensation of all elected offi-
cers must be fixed not later than the first Monday in May in the
year of the election and may not be changed during an officer's
term.144
All non-elected offices must be established by ordinance.' 45
The Code sets out no required non-elected offices although any
such offices existing prior to the effective date of the Code con-
tinue until abolished by ordinance. 4 All non-elected city officers
are to be appointed by the executive authority, with the approval
a time so that each newly appointed member may vote on the filling of the remaining va-
cancies. If there are so many vacancies on the legislative body that it lacks a quorum, the
Governor shall appoint enough members to form a quorum. An appointed "elected" offi-
cial serves only until the next regular election. See Ky. CONST. § 152.
143 KRS § 83A.040(6) (1980). Removal must be approved by a unanimous vote of the
legislative body, exclusive of the member to be removed. Id. No officer may be removed
unless he has been given the right to a "full public hearing." Id. In cities of the first class,
removal is done by a more complicated impeachment procedure. That procedure would
not seem to apply to members of the Board of Aldermen since it is applicable to only "exec-
utive and ministerial officers." KRS § 83.660 (1980).
144 Ky. CONST. § 246; KRS § 83A.070(1) (1980). While an elected officer's compen-
sation may not be "changed" during the term of office, it may be "adjusted" to reflect loss
of purchasing power caused by inflation pursuant to the "rubber dollar theory." Matthews
v. Allen, 360 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1962). Under this theory, the monetary limits on compen-
sation imposed by a 1949 amendment of the Kentucky Constitution are not absolute, but
may increase as the purchasing power of the dollar decreases. Ky. CONST. § 246 (1891,
amended 1949). Thus the actual limits are not the amounts set out in the constitution, but
rather the amount of today's dollars it takes to equal the purchasing power of those dollars
in 1949. The consumer price index is the guide employed for the calculation. Op. Ky.
Att'y Gen. No. 80-171 (Mar. 11, 1980). Contra Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-659 (Dec. 18,
1980).
145 KRS § 83A.080(1) (1980). The ordinance establishing an office "shall specify: (a)
[t]itle of office; (b) [plowers and duties of office; (c) [olath of office; (d) [b]ond, if re-
quired; and (e) [c]ompensation." Id. An officer is defined as
any person elected to a position by the voters or any person appointed to a
position which (a) is created by the Constitution, the general assembly, or a
city; (b) possesses a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of govern-
ment; (c) has powers and duties to be discharged which are conferred direct-
ly or by implication by the city; (d) has duties performed independently and
without control of a superior power other than law; (e) has some per-
manency; (f) requires an official oath; (g) is assigned by a commission or
other written authority; and (h) provides for an official bond if required by
proper authority.
KRS § 83A.010(9) (1980).
146 KRS § 83A.080(3) (1980). Pre-Code law required or defined the following offices
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of the legislative body if the legislative body is separate from the
executive authority. 147
C. Legislative Body Procedure
A city legislative body may speak as a body only through the
passage of legislative measures. Thus rules and procedures are
necessary so the process of deriving a consensus of the members
can be obtained in an orderly fashion. Prior to the Code, there
was no standard format for the enactment of municipal legisla-
tion. The Code provides a uniform procedure modeled upon the
current practice in the Kentucky General Assembly. The proce-
dures set out apply only to ordinances. The statute defines an or-
dinance as "an official action of a city legislative body, which is a
regulation of a general and permanent nature and enforceable as
a local law or is an appropriation of money."'' A city legislative
body may also enact municipal orders 14 and resolutions. 1'
City ordinances must follow a specified form. They must: (1)
be in writing; (2) embrace only one subject and have a title
which clearly states that subject; and (3) have an enacting clause
which reads: "Be it ordained by the City of _.____
Ordinances can be introduced only by a member of the legis-
lative body.15 2 Before an ordinance can be voted upon, it must
have been read twice at meetings held on two separate days.1se
in certain classes of cities: comptroller, clerk, attorney, treasurer, auditory, assessor, col-
lector of taxes, marshal. See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-43 (Jan. 24, 1980); Op. Ky. Att'y
Gen. No. 81-153 (Apr. 15, 1981).
147 KRS § 83A.080(2) (1980). See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 80-239 (Apr. 22, 1980);
Op. Ky. Att'y Gen No. 80-457 (Aug. 20,1980).
148 KRS § 83A.010(10) (1980).
149 A municipal order is defined as "an official act of the legislative body of a munic-
ipality which is binding upon the officers and employes of the municipality and any gov-
ernmental agency over which the municipality has jurisdiction." KBS § 83A.010(8)
(1980). See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-80 (Feb. 26,1981).
150 A resolution is not defined by the Code, but is usually characterized as "an act of
a special or temporary character, not prescribing a permanent rule of government, but is
merely declaratory of the will or opinion of a municipal corporation." 62 C.J.S. Munic-
ipal Corps. § 411 (1949).
151 KRS § 83A.060(1)-(2) (1980).152 See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-207 (May 15,1981).
1' KRS § 83A.060(4) (1980). The procedural requirements of this statute apply only
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The reading requirement is satisfied by stating the title and read-
ing a summary of the ordinance. 154 If an emergency is declared
through a vote of two-thirds of the legislative members, an ordi-
nance may be voted on after one reading. '
If an ordinance receives a majority vote of the members pres-
ent, it becomes effective when published in a local newspaper. 10
In a mayor-council plan city, an ordinance which has passed the
legislative body must be approved by the mayor before it can be-
come effective. 57 The mayor may veto any ordinance, but his
veto may be overridden by a vote of one more than a majority of
the council.'-
In the past cities did not keep enacted ordinances in any or-
derly fashion. Thus it was often very difficult to discover what, if
any, law existed on a particular topic.'59 The Code requires that
all ordinances be kept easily accessible, either in a minute book,
indexed alphabetically by subject matter, or in a code of ordi-
nances. 10 Furthermore, every five years, the city is required to
review and revise ordinances "to eliminate redundant, obsolete,
inconsistent and invalid provisions."'"
to the enactment of ordinances. See Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-80 (Feb. 26, 1981).
154 KRS § 83A.060(4) (1980). A summary is defined as "a brief narrative prepared
under the supervision of an attorney succinctly covering the main points of an official
statement, ordinance or rule in a way reasonably calculated to inform the public in a clear
and understandable manner as to its meaning." KRS § 83A.010(11) (1980).
'-5 KRS § 83A.060(7) (1980).
156 KRS § 83A.060(9) (1980). Except for bond ordinances, any ordinance imposing
fines, forfeitures, imprisonment, taxes, or fees must be published in full. Id. All other ordi-
nances may be published in summary form. Id. Publication shall be pursuant to the provi-
sions of KRS chapter 424. Id. The newspaper used for publication must: (1) be published
in the city; (2) be a regular, at least weekly, paper; (3) have the largest paid circulation in
the area; and (4) have a name or title, consist of at least four pages and be the type of pub-
lication "to which the general public resorts for passing events.., and for current hap-
penings, announcements, miscellaneous reading matter, advertisements and other no-
tices." KRS § 424.120 (1972).
157 KRS § 83A.130(6) (1980).15d.
159 This has been a particularly troublesome problem since the abolition of local
police courts and the establishment of the unified court system. See KY. CONsr. §§ 109-13
(establishing the unified court system).
160 KS § 83A.060(8)(b) (1980).
161 KRS § 83A.060(11) (1980).
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D. Financial Administration
Prior to enactment of the Code, there were few statutory re-
quirements for the financial administration of cities. Even that
most basic of financial planning devices, the budget, was re-
quired only of cities of the first class and cities operating under
the city manager plan.6 Understandably, the drafters of the
Code believed it was necessary that cities be required to conduct
their financial affairs in a responsible manner.6 3 Accordingly,
the Code imposes stringent standards for financial administra-
tion.66
1. Budget
The budget, formally adopted by a legislative body, is the
basic instrument of governmental finance. A budget is defined by
the Code as "a proposed plan for raising and spending money for
specified programs, functions, activities or objectives during a
fiscal year."'6 The Code requires that all cities, regardless of
class, adopt a budget prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. 166
The legislative body must adopt the budget as an ordinance and
no city money may be spent unless the expenditure is pursuant to
the budget. 6 7 In mayor-council cities, the mayor must propose
the budget to the legislative body, 16 but the format of the budget
ordinance is determined by the legislative body. Im The budget
162 See KRS § 89.630, repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 232, § 7, 1980 Ky. Acts
694, 697, and Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 235, § 20, 1980 Ky. Acts 705, 718; KRS § 91.290,
repealed by Act of Apr. 9, 1980, ch. 232, § 7, 1980 Ky. Acts 694, 697.
163 See TOWARD A NEW FOUNDATION, supra note 15, at 15.
114 KRS §§ 91A.020, .030, .040 (1982).
15 KRS § 91A.010(1) (1982).
166 KRS § 91A.030(1) (1982). Cities may adopt a fiscal year beginning January 1,
June 1 or July 1. KRS § 92.020 (1982).
161 KRS § 91A.020(1) (1982).
168 The budget must be prepared by the executive authority and presented to the leg-
islative body. KRS § 91A.030(5) (1982). (Of course, only in cities with a mayor-council
plan is the executive separate from the legislative body.) The budget proposal must be pre-
sented at least 30 days prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. KRS § 91A.030(7) (1982).
A budget message must accompany the proposal explaining features of the budget and
changes from the previous year's budget. Id.
1'9 KRS § 91A.030(8) (1982).
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period is one fiscal year.170 The budget must cover every propri-
etary 71 and governmental fund7 of the city,17 and no budget is
permitted to provide for appropriations that exceed revenues in
any given fiscal year. 174
2. Accounting System
To determine compliance with the budget during the course
of the fiscal year, the city must adopt an accounting system in ac-
cordance with generally accepted principles of governmental ac-
counting.175 The executive authority is responsible for the admin-
istration of the budget and must prepare quarterly operating
statements reflecting the financial state of the city. 76
3. Audit
A budget and an accounting system are incomplete financial
170 KRS § 91A.030(4) (1982).
171 Governmental finances are accounted for on a fund basis. A proprietary fund ac-
counts for activities "that are financed and operated in a manner similar to private bus-
iness enterprises," especially where it is necessary to measure net income. MUNICIPAL FI-
NANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, GOvERNMENTAL AC-
COUNTING. AUDITING, AND FINANCIAL REPORT 9 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MUNICIPAL FI-
NANCE OFFICERS].
172 Government funds are used to account for the basic governmental functions of
the city. There are five basic types: (1) the general fund; (2) special revenue funds; (3) cap-
ital projects funds; (4) debt service funds; and (5) special assessment funds. Id.
173 See KES § 91A.030(1) (1982).
174 Ky. CONST. § 157; KRS S 91A.030(8)(b) (1982).
'75 KRS § 91A.020(1)(b) (1982). Generally accepted principles of governmental ac-
counting (GAAP), are defined to mean "those standards and procedures promulgated and
recognized by the National Council of Governmental Accounting, the municipal finance
officers of the U.S. and Canada and the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun-
tants." KBS § 91A.010(6) (1982). GAAP consists of twelve principles "grouped into seven
categories; GAAP and legal compliance, fund accounting, fixed assets and long-term li-
abilities, basis of accounting, the budget and budgetary accounting, classification and ter-
minology and financial reporting." MUNICIPAL FINANCE OFFICERS, supra note 171, at 8.
The main requirement of GAAP for an accounting system is that it be organized on a fund
basis. Fund accounting differs from business accounting where the entire business is ac-
counted for as a single entity, because with fund accounting "a governmental unit is a
combination of several distinctly different fiscal and accounting entities, each having a
separate set of accounts and functioning independently of other funds and account
groups." NATIONAL COUNCIL ON GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING, GOVERNMENTAL Ac-
COUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING PRINCIPLES: STATEMENT 1, at 6 (1979).
176 KRS § 91A.030(11) (1982).
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management tools unless their accuracy is verified regularly and
independently. The Code requires that all cities conduct an audit
of all city funds at the close of each fiscal year. '7  The audit must
be conducted by either a certified public accountant or the state
auditor of public accounts, 78 and a summary of the audit must
be published in a local newspaper.' 79
CONCLUSION
The municipal code is an ambitious effort by the Kentucky
General Assembly to give cities every opportunity to be effective
governmental units. It is, of course, far too early to determine if
the experiment will be a success. If the Code is a failure, blame
can only be laid at the feet of the cities themselves. The General
Assembly has taken seriously the often heard complaints of city
officials that they are placed in straitjackets by Frankfort and re-
strained from functioning at the level they otherwise could. The
General Assembly has stripped off the straitjackets and placed in
the hands of cities every tool it has to give them. If cities fail to
take advantage of this newly won ability it may appear to future
General Assemblies that cities did not really mean what they said
when they asked for more freedom. Failure to take advantage of
home rule could then very well result in the loss of it and in a re-
turn to the old system, a result which would be extremely unfor-
tunate for all of the Commonwealth's cities.
177 KRS § 91A.040(1) (1982). The audit must be completed within 270 days of the
close of the fiscal year. Id. The contract entered into by the city with the auditor must, at a
minimum, require the auditor to: (1) examine the balance sheets of all city funds; (2) con-
duct the audit in accordance with generally accepted governmental auditing standards;
(3) prepare a report embodying financial statements and his opinion thereon; (4) express
his opinion if the statements express fairly the financial condition of the city; and (5) pre-
sent the audit to the legislative body. KRS § 91A.040(2) (1982).
I7s KRS § 91A.040(I) (1982).
179 KRS § 91A.040(4) (1982). In addition to the audit requirements, each city, ex-
cept those of the first class, is required to publish a financial statement showing "the
amount of funds collected and received, from what source received, the amount dis-
bursed, the date of each disbursement, for what purpose expended and to whom paid."
KRS § 424.220 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The Attorney General first opined that KRS §
424.220 was repealed by implication by KRS § 91A.040. See Op. ICy. Att'y Gen. No. 80-
594 (Nov. 7, 1980). He withdrew that opinion, however, and now reports that cities must
comply with both requirements. Op. Ky. Att'y Gen. No. 81-37 (Feb. 4,1981).
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